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Abandoning the Subjective and Objective
Components of a Well-Founded Fear of
Persecution
Grace Kim*
ABSTRACT
Current asylum law requires that asylum seekers prove that they have a “wellfounded fear of persecution.” However, a “well-founded fear”—the evidentiary standard
in asylum cases—has remained ambiguous and difficult to apply in asylum cases. In
Cardoza-Fonseca, the Supreme Court held that an asylum seeker can establish a wellfounded fear with less than a 50% probability of future persecution. Although the Supreme
Court sought to clarify the meaning of a well-founded fear, the decision has complicated
the evidentiary standard by implying that it consists of two parts: the subjective component
and objective component. The “subjective” component—the asylum seekers’ subjective
fear of being persecuted if they return to their home countries—is superfluous because this
component is rarely contested. The subjective component is essentially a non-issue because
asylum seekers can prove this component by stating that they are afraid to go back to their
home countries. The objective component—whether asylum seekers’ fears are objectively
reasonable—remains unclear. Moreover, courts have misapplied the well-founded fear
standard and interpreted the objective component in inconsistent ways. Thus, this Note
argues that the Supreme Court should eliminate the subjective component in the wellfounded fear analysis and assume that asylum seekers have a genuine fear if they submit
an application. In addition, the Supreme Court should simplify the objectively reasonable
fear analysis to “a reasonable possibility of persecution,” which would be a 10% chance
of persecution. A reasonable possibility of persecution would emphasize how a wellfounded fear points to a threshold or probability of persecution rather than a separate,
convoluted analysis.
INTRODUCTION
Luz Marina Cardoza-Fonseca, a thirty-eight-year-old woman from Nicaragua, faced
deportation because she first entered the United States as a visitor and overstayed her visa.1
In response, she requested asylum in the United States because her life would be threatened

*
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1
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 424 (1987); Cardoza-Fonseca v. U.S. INS, 767 F.2d 1448, 1450
(9th Cir. 1985).
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if she returned to Nicaragua.2 Her brother had been imprisoned and tortured because of his
oppositional political activities against the Sandinistas government, and Cardoza-Fonseca
believed that the Sandinistas knew that they fled together.3 Her asylum case led to the
Supreme Court decision in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, a ground-breaking case that attempted
to clarify the meaning of a “well-founded fear of persecution,” the evidentiary standard in
asylum cases.4 The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s holding by a plurality and
held that the “well-founded fear” standard was a more generous standard than the “clear
probability” or “more likely than not” standard of proof, which requires an asylum seeker
to prove that their claims occurred by more than a 50% chance.5 In other words, the wellfounded fear standard is a burden of proof that requires some probability above 0% but not
as high as 50%.6 However, the Court did not definitively decide what amount of evidence
would be necessary to show that an asylum seeker met the requisite burden of proof.7 Thus,
while Cardoza-Fonseca was able to significantly improve her chances at obtaining asylum,
she and other applicants faced an uncertain future, as the lower courts could decide how
generously they would apply this standard.
The Court also held that a well-founded fear included both a subjective and objective
component, both of which the asylum seeker must establish.8 The “subjective” component
describes asylum seekers’ subjective fear of being persecuted if they return to their home
countries.9 The “objective” component refers to the objective situation that asylum seekers
must establish through evidence to help corroborate the subjective mental state.10 Although
a well-founded fear is necessary in both past persecution and future persecution claims, in
past persecution claims, the asylum applicant already has a presumption of having a wellfounded fear, albeit a rebuttable one.11 The subjective and objective components become
more important factors in future persecution claims. 12 In practice, the subjective and
objective components have become separate components that an asylum seeker must prove
in future persecution claims in addition to the other statutory elements of being a refugee:
persecution, the nexus/causation, and the five protected grounds.13 The Court’s explanation
regarding the subjective and objective components to a well-founded fear of future
persecution further complicates an already ambiguous standard.14
These additional components that asylum seekers must prove are problematic
because the subjective component is superfluous, and the objective component is confusing
for courts to apply. First, while the subjective component is less problematic, since parties
rarely contest the subjective component in asylum cases, it becomes unnecessary in the
2

Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 424.
Id.
4
Id. at 427–50.
5
Id. at 425, 431, 450.
6
Id.
7
Id. at 449–50.
8
Id. at 430–31.
9
Id.
10
Id. at 440.
11
See Humberto H. Ocariz & Jorge L. Lopez, Practical Implications of INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca:
Evidencing Eligibility for Asylum under the “Well-Founded Fear of Persecution” Standard, 19 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REV. 617, 644 n.189 (1988).
12
Id.
13
Id. at 644.
14
Cardoza Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 430–31.
3
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overall analysis of whether an applicant should be granted asylum. 15 The subjective
component is essentially a non-issue because the asylum seekers can prove this component
by stating that they are afraid to go back to their home country.16 Ocariz and Lopez discuss
the implications of INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca in their article, Practical Implications of INS
v. Cardoza-Fonseca: Evidencing Eligibility for Asylum under the “Well-Founded Fear of
Persecution” Standard, stating that “an alien’s fear is generally not questioned” and a
court’s discussion of a person’s fear “is no more than formalism.” 17 Ocariz and Lopez
explain how the United National Handbook assumes that unless a person just wants to seek
adventure, no one would normally abandon one’s home and country without some
compelling reason.18
Second, the objective component of the well-founded fear standard leads to
confusion because the Supreme Court has not sufficiently clarified how to apply the
objective element.19 The Court simply stated that it did not “attempt to set forth a detailed
description of how the well-founded fear test should be applied.”20 Instead, the Court stated
that there should be “case-by-case adjudication,” which respects the agency’s interpretation
of any ambiguity Congress intentionally created through the language of well-founded
fear. 21 This ambiguity has led to lower courts inconsistently applying the objective
component in asylum claims.22
As shown in Part II, the Court’s decision has led the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA) and various circuit courts to use the objective component of a well-founded fear to
repetitively analyze all three of the elements for meeting refugee status—the persecution,
the protected grounds the alien is claiming, and the nexus or causation between the
persecution and protected category—within the well-founded fear analysis.23 However, in
future persecution claims, the “objectively reasonable fear” is supposed to be a minimal
burden of proof that can be framed as a probability of an asylum seeker facing persecution
if he or she returns to his or her home country.24 Courts often conflate the well-founded
fear analysis, which refers to the future probability of persecution, with the rest of the
analysis regarding the elements of being a refugee.25 Thus, the confusion of how to apply
the well-founded fear standard can lead courts to engage in a more convoluted analysis of
objectively reasonable fear. The Supreme Court should clarify that a well-founded fear is

15

Ocariz & Lopez, supra note 11.
Id. at 645.
17
Id.
18
Id. The UN Handbook is a document that explains the UN procedures and criteria for determining
refugee status and other matters.
19
Infra Part II.
20
INS v. Cardoza Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 448.
21
Id. There are various agencies that handle immigration affairs: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP), and Department of Homeland Security (DHS). See U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS.,
https://www.uscis.gov/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2021); U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS ENF’T, https://www.ice.gov/
(last visited Feb. 2, 2021); U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, https://www.cbp.gov/ (last visited
Feb. 2, 2021); DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2021).
22
Infra Part II.
23
Infra Part II.
24
See INS v. Cardoza Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
25
Infra Part II.
16
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not a separate element that must be established when demonstrating future persecution but
an evidentiary burden that refers to the likelihood of the persecution.
In addition, even though the well-founded fear standard does not require the asylum
seeker to show that the probability of persecution is more than 50%, the BIA and the circuit
courts have not agreed on what burden of proof this standard actually entails.26 Given the
ambiguity, jurisdictions may choose to interpret this burden of proof as leniently or strictly
as they choose, whether that is applying a 5% chance of persecution or a 45% chance of
persecution. Cardoza-Fonseca suggested that a 10% chance of persecution may be
sufficient to show a well-founded fear, and some circuits have adopted this view. 27 In
Cardoza-Fonseca, the Supreme Court used a hypothetical example to illuminate what
could be a well-founded fear of persecution:
Let us . . . presume that it is known that in the applicant’s country of origin
every tenth adult male person is either put to death or sent to some remote
labor camp. . . In such a case it would be only too apparent that anyone who
has managed to escape from the country in question will have a “wellfounded fear of persecution” upon his eventual return.28
Some courts have chosen to adopt this language while others have completely ignored this
part of the Supreme Court opinion.29
The BIA has tried to use language stating than an alien has an objective fear if a
“reasonable person in their circumstances would fear persecution were they in their home
country” in order to clarify the objective standard. 30 Applicants would need “credible,
direct, specific evidence” to support their claims.31 However, the language that the BIA
uses is not even applied in all circuit courts.32 Thus, there is no uniformity regarding the
interpretation of the statutory language, and the BIA and the circuit courts adjudicate
claims about an asylum seeker’s well-founded fear of future persecution in different ways.
Thus, the well-founded fear of future persecution standard should be simplified to
mean a reasonable possibility of persecution in light of the circumstances of the asylum
seeker. The subjective and objective aspects of a well-founded fear of persecution
unnecessarily complicate the analysis. The Supreme Court should eliminate the subjective
component in the well-founded fear analysis because the asylum seeker should be
presumed to have a genuine fear if the person submits an application. In addition, the
Supreme Court should change the objectively reasonable fear analysis to “a reasonable
possibility of persecution” in order to simplify the meaning of a well-founded fear of
persecution. A reasonable possibility of persecution would emphasize how a well-founded
fear points to a threshold or probability of persecution. The Supreme Court should clarify
26

See id.
See Al-Harbi v. INS, 242 F.3d 888 (9th Cir. 2001).
28
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 431 (quoting ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 180 (1966)).
29
See Infra Part I.
30
Guevara Flores v. INS, 786 F.2d 1242, 1249 (5th Cir. 1986); Carcamo-Flores v. INS, 805 F.2d 60, 68 (2d
Cir. 1986); In re C-A-L-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 754, 759 (BIA 1997); Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439,
445 (BIA 1987).
31
Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 444 (quoting Diaz-Escobar v. INS, 782 F.2d 1488, 1492 (9th Cir. 1986)).
32
See Infra Part I(a), (b).
27
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that the objective component is not a separate analysis that must be applied to every
element of proving one’s refugee status but is an evidentiary burden that refers to the
likelihood of the future persecution. A “reasonable possibility” of at least a ten-percent
chance of persecution, as suggested in the example used in Cardoza-Fonseca, should
suffice to show a well-founded fear. The ten-percent standard would enable courts to
adjudicate decisions based on a specific frame of reference and take into account the
humanitarian concerns that inspired asylum law.33
Part I provides a general overview of asylum law so that readers can better
understand the structure of asylum claims. Part II showcases how the ambiguity regarding
the objective component has led to a plethora of confusing administrative and court
opinions that do not properly determine whether an asylum seeker has a well-founded
fear.34 Part II will analyze how the BIA and the circuit courts structure their analysis of the
objective component of a well-founded fear in future persecution claims and what kind of
evidentiary burden the BIA and circuit courts are using to prove a well-founded fear.35 Part
II will also argue that the BIA and various circuit courts’ objective fear analysis forces
asylum seekers to present the same evidence that proves the substantive three elements of
being a refugee, which is redundant and unnecessary. Instead, the well-founded fear
element should simply address whether the asylum seeker has a well-founded fear based
in reality. Furthermore, the BIA and some circuit courts do not clearly discern which of the
three substantive elements are problematic in an asylum seeker’s case and have improperly
collapsed the three-step analysis under the well-founded fear of persecution. These courts
then present a generic argument that the asylum seekers failed to show an objective, wellfounded fear.36 This Part also delves into how the circuit courts interpret the standard for
an objective, well-founded fear of persecution in strikingly different ways and how the
circuit courts are prone to use the standard that they desire depending on the case.
Part III delves into the repercussions of confusion in the well-founded fear of
persecution analysis. It shows how ambiguity has created an additional burden for
practitioners and the potential to allow dangerous biases to affect the adjudication
process. 37 This Part will explain how the lack of structure and clarity in the courts’
evaluation of the objective component leads to both a redundant and confusing analysis
that does not properly interpret the well-founded fear that asylum seekers must prove. Part
IV provides suggestions for how the interpretation of a well-founded fear can be
streamlined for a uniform application in future cases. Part V offers concluding thoughts
about the urgency and importance of implementing changes to the application of a wellfounded fear.
I.

OVERVIEW OF ASYLUM LAW

Asylum law in the United States is based on international law and its legal obligations
under the Refugee Convention.38 The United States ratified the United Nations Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees in 1968, and it adopted the Convention’s definition of a
33

Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 431.
See Infra Part II.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
See infra Part III.
38
See DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES § 1:1 (2020 ed.).
34
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“refugee” and codified procedures for how to apply for asylum status in the Refugee Act
of 1980.39 Since Congress amended its immigration laws, United States administrative and
judicial authorities have developed a complex body of law that elaborates on who can claim
asylum status and is legally a refugee.40
Under United States law, the grant of asylum is discretionary and is based on the
definition of a refugee.41 The Immigration and Nationality Act defines refugees as aliens
who are unable or unwilling to return to their native countries “because of persecution or a
well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.”42 The definition of a refugee includes three
main elements: (1) “persecution,” (2) the “on account of” nexus element, and (3) the
statutorily protected grounds, which include “race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.”43 First, asylum seekers must show that they
suffered severe harm that rises to the level of persecution. 44 Severe harm can include
physical violence, mental and psychological harm, forced renunciation of beliefs,
economic harm, and discrimination generally.45 The persecution must also involve some
absence of state protection, whether that is because the state is unable or unwilling to
protect the asylum seeker.46 Second, the “on account of” nexus element proves causality
and shows that the persecution occurred because the applicant is part of a protected class.47
Claimants are not required to establish nexus through direct proof, and circumstantial proof
regarding country condition reports, treatment of others in similar circumstances, and past
actions or statements of the persecutor may be enough.48 Third, “race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion” are the only grounds upon
which applicants can claim asylum.49 The BIA has described the grounds of persecution as
identifying qualities of fundamental difference or immutability, and asylum seekers can
claim one or more of these protected grounds.50
39

United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July 28, 1951, 19
U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137; United Nations Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for
signature Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267; Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94
Stat. 102 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.A.).
40
ANKER, supra note 38.
41
Id. at § 2:1.
42
Immigration and Nationality Act §101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No.
116-188).
43
AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN, JR., ET. AL., FRAGOMEN ON IMMIGRATION FUNDAMENTALS § 6:2 (5th ed. 2015).
44
ANKER, supra note 38, at § 4:12.
45
Id.
46
Id. at § 4:8.
47
Id. at § 5:1.
48
RAIO Combined Training Course, Nexus and the Protected Grounds 19 (Apr. 30, 2013), available
at perma.cc/N5J6-Y9AP (removed from USCIS website) (“Often, an applicant will not be able to provide
direct evidence of motive, since persecutors usually do not announce their motives or explain their
actions.”); see also Garcia-Martinez v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 1066, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Persecutors do not
always take the time to tell their victims all the reasons they are being beaten, kidnapped, or killed.”
(emphasis in original) (quoting Gafoor v. I.N.S., 231 F.3d 645, 650, 55 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1006, 177
A.L.R. Fed. 687 (9th Cir. 2000))); I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483, 112 S. Ct. 812, 117 L. Ed.
2d 38 (1992) (“[Petitioner] objects that he cannot be expected to provide direct proof of his persecutors'
motives. We do not require that.”).
49
AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN, JR., supra note 43.
50
See Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985) (overruled in part on other grounds
by, Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (BIA 1987)) (“Each of these grounds describes persecution
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The definition of a refugee also includes a well-founded fear of persecution, which
is the standard of proof for asylum claims. Asylum seekers have the burden of proof to
demonstrate persecution in asylum proceedings and can broadly assert two different kinds
of claims: past persecution and future persecution claims. 51 As mentioned in the
Introduction, an applicant who has established a past persecution claim has a presumption
of a well-founded fear of future persecution.52 However, asylum officers or immigration
judges can rebut the presumption if the government shows by a preponderance of the
evidence that (1) there has been a fundamental change in circumstances or (2) the applicant
can relocate to another part of the country and avoid future persecution.53 As explained
above, an applicant seeking to establish a future persecution claim must demonstrate a
well-founded fear of persecution according to Cardoza-Fonseca, which includes a
subjective and objective component.54
Applicants can meet their burden of proof through their own testimonies, especially
since courts have recognized the difficulty of collecting evidence when asylum seekers are
running for their lives.55 Under the REAL ID Act of 2005, the testimony of an applicant
may be sufficient to sustain one’s burden of proof without additional corroboration if the
trier-of-fact finds that the applicant’s testimony is credible, persuasive, and refers to
specific facts sufficient to demonstrate that the applicant is a refugee.56 Thus, for many
asylum seekers who do not have much corroborating evidence, their credibility
determinations often decide the fates of their cases. The difficulty of finding corroborating
evidence further highlights the importance of clarifying the evidentiary burden required by
a well-founded fear of persecution.
II.

THE BIA AND CIRCUIT COURTS’ MUDDLED INTERPRETATIONS OF AN OBJECTIVE,
WELL-FOUNDED FEAR

This Note analyzes cases from the BIA, the Seventh Circuit, the Ninth Circuit, and
the Eleventh Circuit to demonstrate how courts have chosen significantly different
interpretations and methods to apply the well-founded fear standard in asylum cases. The
BIA decisions show how the BIA reviews cases appealed from an Immigration Judge (IJ)
and how it analyzes the “objective fear” component. The case law of the three circuit courts
reveals a wide ideological spectrum and demonstrates how each circuit reviews
determinations about an asylum applicant’s “objective fear” very differently. The Seventh
Circuit decisions showcase how a circuit that has a reputation for adopting more moderate
views, at least compared to the Ninth Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit, reviews asylum

aimed at an immutable characteristic: a characteristic that either is beyond the power of an individual to
change or is so fundamental to individual identity or conscience that it ought not be required to be
changed.” (citations omitted)); ANKER, supra note 38, at § 5.16.
51
8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13, 1208.13.
52
8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(b)(1), 1208.13(b)(1) (“An applicant who has been found to have established … past
persecution shall also be presumed to have a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of the original
claim.”).
53
8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(b)(1)(i), 1208.13(b)(1)(i).
54
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430–31 (1987).
55
Dawoud v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 608, 612–13 (7th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted);
56
Immigration and Nationality Act § 208(b)(1)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii).
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cases. 57 The Seventh Circuit also has a significant amount of experience reviewing
immigration cases because of its jurisdiction over Chicago, which has historically been a
sanctuary city for immigrants.58 The Ninth Circuit decisions display how one of the most
liberal circuit courts that has often blocked policies that are unfavorable to asylum seekers
reviews appeals from the BIA. 59 The Ninth Circuit is also important because it has
adjudicated the most asylum cases.60 The Eleventh Circuit decisions demonstrate how a
more conservative circuit, which includes three states in the “Deep South,” decides asylum
cases in its jurisdiction.61 In fact, the Eleventh Circuit has one of the lowest remand rates
for asylum cases appealed by asylum seekers.62
Circuit courts review cases differently from the BIA because the circuit courts
reviewing BIA decisions have to give deference to the factual findings.63 The courts must
evaluate whether the BIA’s findings of fact are supported by “substantial evidence,” which
courts have held to mean what a “reasonable factfinder would have to conclude that the
requisite fear of persecution existed.”64 The courts review legal conclusions de novo, but
they must apply Chevron deference for certain agency interpretations of statutes. 65
Nonetheless, comparing the logic of various circuit courts exposes the confusion that arises
without a clear standard for well-founded fear and the resulting inconsistencies in
evaluating the objective component. Although this case study examines only a fraction of
the judicial immigration system, analyzing these circuits will demonstrate how the absence
of a clear standard for objective fear has led to disparate results.

57

See Pratt School of Information, Circuit Court Map, VISUAL FIRST AMENDMENT,
http://visualfa.org/circuit-court-map/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2019).
58
See Mauricio Peña, How Does Chicago’s Sanctuary Law Stack Up Against Other Cities, CHIC.
MAGAZINE (July 17, 2017), https://www.chicagomag.com/city-life/July-2017/Chicagos-Welcoming-CityOrdinance/.
59
See Ross Todd, 9th Circuit Upholds 2 Injunctions Blocking Trump Asylum Changes, LAW.COM (Feb. 28,
2020), https://www.law.com/therecorder/2020/02/28/ninth-circuit-upholds-nationwide-injunction-blockingtrump-asylum-changes/; See Pratt School of Information, supra note 57. The U.S. Department of Justice’s
statistics also showcase that cities in the Ninth Circuit have some of the lowest denial rates. See U.S. DEP’T
OF JUST. EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, STATISTICS YEARBOOK FISCAL YEAR 2017 at 28,
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1107056/download.
60
Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz, & Philip G. Schrag, REFUGEE ROULETTE: DISPARITIES IN
ASYLUM ADJUDICATIONS AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 82 (2009); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, supra note 59, at 9.
61
See Suzanne Monyak, Murdered Sisters Not Enough To Win Asylum, 11th Cir. Says, LAW360, (Jan. 23,
2020, 7:05 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1237065/murdered-sisters-not-enough-to-win-asylum11th-circ-says; See Pratt School of Information, supra note 57.
62
RAMJI-NOGALES, supra note 60, at 67.
63
INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812, 815 (1992).
64
Id.; Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001).
65
See Ghaly v. INS, 58 F.3d 1425, 1429 (9th Cir. 1995). The Chevron doctrine provides a framework for
when courts must defer to agency interpretations of statutes. First, a court must examine whether Congress
has clearly spoken on an issue and if the agency’s interpretation follows Congress’s intent. Second, if the
statute is silent or ambiguous on an issue, then the court must decide if the agency’s interpretation is based
on a permissible interpretation of the statute. An agency has the power to interpret statutes if Congress
explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill. In this case, the agency’s interpretation is subject to deference
provided that it is not arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. If Congress implicitly left a
gap for the agency to fill, then courts must defer to the agency’s interpretation as long as the interpretation
is reasonable. 6 Administrative Law § 51.01 (2020).
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A. Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions
Soon after the Supreme Court decided INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, the BIA sought to
further clarify how a well-founded fear of persecution could be applied in asylum cases. In
1987, in Matter of Mogharrabi, the BIA concluded that the asylum seeker Mogharrabi
would have a well-founded fear of persecution if he were returned to Iran. 66 The BIA
adopted the Ninth Circuit’s view that the objective component requires an asylum seeker
to use “credible, direct, and specific evidence” to support a reasonable fear of
persecution.67 As an initial matter, the BIA assessed Mogharrabi’s credibility and found
that the record supported that he was credible, which fulfilled the evidentiary burden to
show he had a well-founded fear.68 The BIA then provided four factors to help define a
well-founded fear: (1) the claimant possesses a belief or characteristic the persecutor seeks
to overcome, (2) the persecutor is already aware or there is a reasonable possibility the
persecutor could become aware that the claimant possesses this belief or characteristic, (3)
the persecutor has the capability of punishing the claimant, and (4) the persecutor has the
inclination to punish the claimant.69 If the claimant fulfills all four factors, then an asylum
seeker likely has a well-founded fear of persecution.70
The four-factor test, although promising, still has the effect of forcing asylum seekers
to repeat the same information that they would already have to present to prove other
elements of being a refugee. 71 The first factor of whether the applicant has a belief or
characteristic the persecutor seeks to overcome is redundant because asylum seekers have
to already prove separately that they are being persecuted “on account of” a “race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”72 Although the
remaining factors also attempt to clarify the evidentiary burden of the well-founded fear
standard, the last three factors have a repetitive effect because they also address the “on
account of” nexus that an asylum seeker has to prove anyway.73 Thus, due to the structure
of the well-founded fear analysis, the asylum applicant must prove similar components
twice when trying to prove that she has a well-founded fear and then prove the general
statutory elements of being a refugee.
Furthermore, despite the BIA’s efforts to clarify the well-founded fear standard in
Matter of Mogharrabi, the BIA failed to delineate what probability of persecution would
satisfy the objective component of the well-founded fear analysis.74 The BIA here adopted
the Fifth Circuit position that a person has established a well-founded fear if “a reasonable
person in his circumstances would fear persecution.”75 The BIA further elaborated that an
applicant has established a well-founded fear when a “reasonable person may
well fear persecution even where its likelihood is significantly less than clearly
probable.”76 However, the BIA did not mention the 10% chance of persecution standard
66
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derived from the Supreme Court’s Cardoza-Fonseca hypothetical example, or any
numerical probability, as a way to frame the evidentiary burden.77
Indeed, the Mogharrabi factors have arguably only led to more confusion in how to
analyze whether an applicant has a well-founded fear because the factors are not applied
consistently in BIA cases or in the circuit courts. The BIA suggests that adjudicators should
use these factors moving forward to clarify the analysis regarding a well-founded fear.78 A
January 2019 United States Citizenship and Immigration Services Officer Training manual
also recommended using these four factors.79 However, many of the circuit court cases
addressing the objective component of an asylum seeker’s fear often do not mention the
Mogharrabi factors, and the proper use of the objective standard still remains unclear.80
In 1997, ten years after Mogharrabi was decided, the BIA case In re C-A-L
showcased the limited and confusing applicability that Matter of Mogharrabi has had on
future adjudications. 81 In this case, the BIA denied the applicant’s appeal from an IJ’s
decision that denied his application for asylum and withholding of removal.82 The BIA
cited Mogharrabi to explain the well-founded fear standard, which is established if the
asylum applicant shows “that a ‘reasonable person’ in his circumstances
would fear persecution upon return to his native country.”83 Yet the BIA failed to mention
any of the Mogharrabi factors. 84 This absence shows the limited applicability of the
Mogharrabi standard and demonstrates how the well-founded fear standard may be applied
differently even within the BIA itself. Mogharrabi’s failure to delineate the applicant’s
burden of proof also permeates this BIA decision. Although the majority opinion would
deny applying a higher burden of proof, the dissenting opinion points out that the majority
seemed to have denied the asylum seeker’s application because it applied a burden of proof
that is higher than the one in ten chance of suffering persecution standard that the Supreme
Court set forth. 85 Thus, In re C-A-L demonstrates how the ambiguity regarding what
probability would satisfy the well-founded fear standard allows the BIA to inconsistently
apply the well-founded fear standard in each case that it adjudicates.
B. Seventh Circuit Decisions
The Seventh Circuit also applies the objective component of a well-founded fear on
its own terms by not using the BIA’s Mogharrabi framework and generally defining an
objectively reasonable fear as “a reasonable possibility of suffering such persecution.”86 In
Bereza v. INS, the Seventh Circuit reviewed the objective component of Bereza’s future
persecution claim and concluded that substantial evidence supported the BIA's decision
that Bereza was not entitled to asylum.87 Bereza claimed that he would be persecuted based
77
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on his political opinion.88 He presented evidence from his past, explaining that his mother
was an anti-Stalinist political prisoner, that he participated in political protests in Ukraine,
and that he experienced backlash and discrimination throughout his life.89
The Seventh Circuit did not explain which part of Bereza’s asylum claim failed the
Mogharrabi factors as a framework. Instead, it provided a list of evidence that countered
Bereza’s future persecution claim. 90 The court explained that the Soviet Union was
dissolved, and that the Communist party was illegal.91 The court also referenced a United
States State Department report that noted there was little likelihood that the current
Ukrainian security forces would mistreat individuals because of their support for Ukrainian
independence at some time in the past, even though the security forces were made up of
some of the same members as before Ukraine’s independence. 92 Here, the Seventh
Circuit’s analysis is problematic because the court essentially attacked the nexus element
of the asylum seeker’s claim without stating that the nexus was the element that the asylum
seeker had failed to prove. Thus, analyzing whether someone has an objective, wellfounded fear of persecution has led to an ineffective analysis in which the court not only
re-analyzes the elements of being a refugee but also presents all the weak evidence of an
asylum seeker’s claim to justify a denial of an application, without specifying which part
of the definition of a refugee the asylum seeker has failed to prove.
Regarding the evidentiary burden, the Seventh Circuit defined an objectively
reasonable fear as “a reasonable possibility of actually suffering such persecution.”93 In
Bereza, the Seventh Circuit also addressed the reasonable possibility of suffering
persecution but did not elucidate what threshold a petitioner would have to reach in order
to show a reasonable possibility. 94 Again, there is no mention of a 10% possibility of
persecution that the Supreme Court suggested in its hypothetical or any kind of percentage
that would guide the court in determining the asylum seeker’s burden of proof.
In a more recent case, the Seventh Circuit disagreed with the BIA’s holding that an
asylum seeker did not have an objective basis for her asylum claim, and the Seventh Circuit
pointed to how the BIA failed to engage in a robust analysis of the asylum seeker’s
evidence.95 In Oyekunle v. Gonzales, a Nigerian woman applied for asylum because she
feared that her husband and father-in-law would force her to undergo female circumcision
if she was returned to Nigeria.96 Her husband protected her against the procedure at first,
but he changed his mind when his father refused to let him inherit his father’s farm if he
did not circumcise his wife.97 The BIA relied on a “country report, [a] lawyer’s letter, and
the husband’s apology” to conclude that her fear was not well-founded and had no
objective basis.98
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Interestingly, Circuit Judge Posner, who wrote the opinion for the court, did not
frame the well-founded fear analysis in terms of the subjective and objective component.99
Instead, Posner analyzed whether Oyekunle had a well-founded fear by scrutinizing the
evidence the BIA chose to use to support its decision.100 The Seventh Circuit ultimately
determined that Oyekunle’s evidence was not inconsistent with her claim of a well-founded
fear.101 Posner commented on how the country report which the BIA relied on had little
bearing on the case. 102 The report showed that the Nigerian region where Oyekunle's
father-in-law lived had outlawed female circumcision, but the findings did not negate the
fact that her father-in-law still wanted to and could circumcise her in another part of
Nigeria.103 In addition, the BIA used the claimant’s lawyer’s letter from three years prior
telling the petitioner to not return to Nigeria until the situation “cooled down” to argue
much time had passed and the circumstances in her region may be better. 104 However,
Posner noted that the BIA was speculating, and the lawyer’s comments from three years
prior did not make the asylum seeker’s claim more or less probable.105 Finally, Posner
emphasized that the husband’s letter of apology did not actually indicate whether the
husband would protect his wife if she returned or would succumb to his father’s wishes in
order to receive the farm as an inheritance.106 Posner explained that these documents did
not discredit the asylum seeker’s own testimony, and thus, all of her evidence either
supported or was at least consistent with her fear of persecution.107 Judge Posner’s opinion
demonstrates how the lack of clarity and guidance regarding the application of the objective
component can lead the BIA to insufficiently analyze asylum seekers’ claims. Specifically,
Posner exposes how the BIA uses one-sided evidence to justify its decision without
evaluating the quality of the evidence itself.
Judge Posner also commented that the objective component the BIA relied on is
basically analogous to the showing of a well-founded fear. He commented that “requiring
that an ‘objective basis’ be shown for a ‘well-founded fear’ is redundant; a well-founded,
as distinct from a groundless, fear has by definition an objective basis.” 108 Posner’s
comments expose how the objective component has become a separate analysis, even when
the point is to meet a threshold in which one has a well-founded fear that is grounded in
reality. Thus, Posner writes that “[t]he Board should resist the urge to multiply entities” of
analysis, which serve as superfluous elements for asylum seekers to prove and muddles the
analysis for future persecution claims.109 Although Posner does not discuss the fact that the
objective component should refer to a certain possibility of facing persecution, his
Judge Posner only referred to the subjective fear of persecution to say that “the Board did not question
the accuracy of her testimony, holding only that it did not demonstrate an objective, as distinct from her
subjective, fear of persecution.” Oyekunle, 498 F.3d at 716. In addition, Judge Posner only referred to the
objective component to comment upon how the BIA used the language “objective basis” to analyze the
asylum seeker’s claim. See id. at 717.
100
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statement captures how the objective analysis has failed to fulfill its intended purpose and
taken a life of its own.
The absence of discussion regarding the 10% chance of persecution in Bereza and
Oyekunle is in stark contrast to how another Seventh Circuit case called Kllokoqi v.
Gonzales articulated its legal standards.110 The court in Kllokoqi, which decided the case
two years before Oyekunle, remanded the asylum claim because the IJ failed to fully
consider all Kllokoqi’s arguments. 111 Here, the court defined a well-founded fear as a
“reasonable possibility of future persecution,” but it explicitly stated that “the applicant
may establish a reasonable possibility of future persecution by showing that there is even
a 10 percent chance that he will be shot, tortured, or otherwise persecuted.”112 Thus, these
decisions showcase how the ambiguity of the well-founded fear standard continues to
impact courts like the Seventh Circuit and causes courts to inconsistently define and apply
the well-founded fear standard, even within their own jurisdictions.
C. Ninth Circuit Decisions
Similarly to the Seventh Circuit, the Ninth Circuit explained that a well-founded fear
meant a “reasonable possibility” of persecution.113 However, the Ninth Circuit consistently
mentions that a 10% chance of persecution is enough to establish a well-founded fear.114
In Melkonian v. Ashcroft, the Ninth Circuit reviewed whether the asylum seeker’s
subjective fear of future persecution was objectively reasonable, ultimately finding it
was.115 The asylum seeker was an ethnic Armenian and Christian who lived in Abkhazia,
Georgia.116 At the time, ethnic-Abkhaz Separatists were engaging in ethnic cleansing.117
He fled across the Russian border to escape kidnaping by Separatists. 118 When the court
adjudicated Melkonian’s future persecution claim, it stated that the proper inquiry in this
asylum case was whether Melkonian’s refusal to return to Abkhazia was based on a
credible subjective fear of persecution by the Abkhaz, whether the persecution he feared
was on account of a statutorily protected ground, and whether the fear was objectively
reasonable.119
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When the court analyzed the “objectively reasonable” component, it proceeded to
use the reasoning that it should be using to establish the applicable protected classes and
the nexus factor (the causation between the persecution and the protected grounds). The
court discussed how the Separatists not only persecuted Melkonian because of his failure
to fight for them but also because he was part of various other protected classes.120 The
court concluded that he was persecuted because of his “prior support for the Georgians
(political opinion), and because he [was] an Armenian (ethnicity) and a Christian
(religion).” 121 Thus, the court was not analyzing whether Melkonian’s fear was wellfounded; the court was evaluating whether there was a nexus between the protected classes
and the persecution. Here, the court’s analysis of the objective component of a “wellfounded fear” improperly analyzes the facts underlying the substantive elements instead of
confirming or denying that an applicant faced a certain possibility of future persecution
based on the established facts.
Interestingly, in Melkonian, the Ninth Circuit explicitly mentioned that a 10%
probability of persecution would be enough. 122 The court stated that to “satisfy the
objective component of the well-founded fear test, an applicant need only produce credible
evidence that persecution is a “reasonable possibility” and cited to INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca
to show that a 10% probability would be “sufficient.”123 It also noted that a way to support
one’s burden of proof is through credible, direct, and specific evidence in the record.124 In
the end, the court used the 10% probability standard to say that the “evidence compels the
conclusion that Melkonian has more than met his burden.”125
Another Ninth Circuit case similarly addressed the objective component of the
asylum seeker’s case by repeating points that asylum seekers already have to show to
receive refugee status. In Al-Harbi v. INS, the Ninth Circuit held that the asylum seeker
fulfilled the objective component of his asylum claim in spite of the fact that he had an
adverse credibility determination by the IJ and the BIA.126 Al-Harbi was a Shia’a Muslim
from Iraq who deserted the Iraqi army, rejoined the army later on, and later protested the
presidential election in which Hussein was the only candidate.127 Al-Harbi’s friends who
aided him in passing anti-government flyers were arrested, and Al-Harbi eventually fled to
Guam.128
Because the Ninth Circuit treats the objective component as a separate element that
asylum seekers must establish, the objective part of the analysis proves to be a reiteration
of what asylum seekers have already tried to demonstrate in different parts of their cases.
For example, in Al-Harbi, the court applied the well-founded fear standard to each of the
three elements needed to prove that one is a refugee, although the court did not explicitly
say so. First, the court concluded that substantial evidence supported the claim that the
Iraqi government would consider the petitioner a dissident because of his association with
the American airlift of Iraqi dissidents, and he would be considered a dissident for this
120
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reason, thereby addressing whether the asylum seeker is in a protected group.129 Second,
the court determined that the asylum seeker would likely face harms that result in the death
penalty, thus establishing that the harms did rise to the level of persecution.130 Third, the
court discussed whether Iraq would regard all the evacuees as traitors and persecute them,
which appears to be analyzing whether there is a nexus between the persecution and the
imputed political opinion.131 Although the court structured its analysis of an objective fear
of persecution in an organized manner, the petitioner essentially had to prove the elements
of being a refugee twice because he not only had to prove the three elements of being a
refugee, but also had to address the same points regarding level of persecution, statutorily
protected groups, and nexus in discussing his objectively reasonable fear of persecution.
However, the court in Al-Harbi properly interpreted the objective component as a
way to determine the probability of persecution, similarly to how the court analyzed
Melkonian.132 Rather than listing all the evidence in favor or against the asylum seeker in
a haphazard fashion, the court focused on how the evidence made the possibility of
persecution more or less likely.133 The Ninth Circuit stated that “the principal question,
then, is whether there is sufficient likelihood that Petitioner would be persecuted for
political beliefs that his persecutors would impute to him.” 134 Although the “sufficient
likelihood” language in this case is different from the language the court used in Melkonian,
both cases still used the framework of whether the petitioner’s fear was “objectively
reasonable” and whether there was a “reasonable possibility” of persecution.135 The court
also stated that it must evaluate the “likely treatment upon deportation to Iraq” and the
“likely possibility of torture and/or execution for his involvement in the U. S.-led operation,”
which correctly emphasized that the courts should focus on the possibility of facing
persecution on account of a protected basis.136
The Ninth Circuit set forth an evidentiary burden in Al-Harbi that clarified the
probability of persecution that the asylum seeker needs to establish.137 As in other Ninth
Circuit decisions, the court stated that it can determine whether an asylum seeker has
satisfied the requisite burden of proof by evaluating whether the petitioner has offered
“credible, direct, and specific evidence.”138 This case once again affirmed that “even a tenpercent chance of persecution may establish a well-founded fear.”139 The Ninth Circuit
followed the spirit of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Cardoza-Fonseca’s and the Supreme
Court’s statements that it is enough if there is a “reasonable possibility” of persecution.140
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D. Eleventh Circuit Decisions

The Eleventh Circuit analyzes the “objective” component differently from the other
circuits by stating that asylum seekers have an objectively reasonable fear when they have
a “good reason to fear future persecution” and by declining to use a percentage to
conceptualize a well-founded fear. In Usmanov v. United States AG, the Eleventh Circuit
held that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s finding that Usmanov’s fear of
persecution was not objectively reasonable and denied Usmanov’s petition for review of
the decision.141 In Uzbekistan, Usmanov gave a TV interview criticizing the government
healthcare, was fired from his job, interrogated for hours, beaten, and prevented from
working in the medical profession.142 The Mahalla, neighborhood committees used by the
Uzbek government to control the community, would often monitor and visit him.143 The
main question was whether Usmanov had a well-founded fear of future persecution, and
specifically, whether his fear of persecution based on imputed political opinion was
objectively reasonable.144
When the Eleventh Circuit held that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s
conclusions, the court listed all the evidence that weighed against Usmanov in no particular
order and inappropriately used the objective component to address other elements such as
level of persecution, nexus.145 For example, the court pointed to how Usmanov did not
have an “objectively reasonable” fear of persecution but a fear of “mere harassment and
intimidation” because the Mahalla visited and asked him questions but did not “threaten or
harm him.” 146 By determining in the objectively well-founded fear analysis that
Usmanov’s claim involved mere harassment and intimidation, the court concluded that the
events he experienced did not rise to the level of persecution without clarifying that the
court was analyzing this aspect of his case.147 The court also referred to how even though
Usmanov was physically assaulted during the two to three hour interrogation and was being
monitored by the Mahalla, he remained in Uzbekistan for eight years and even returned to
Uzbekistan for two months.148 The court used his extended stay in Uzbekistan after an
incident to point to how his fear is not objectively reasonable. However, what the court
doubted was whether Usmanov actually faced suffering on account of a protected factor
(nexus) when Usmanov’s imputed political opinion did not prevent him from living in
Uzbekistan for a prolonged period of time.149 The court also questioned if the government
was persecuting Usmanov on account of his imputed political opinion if Usmanov testified
saying “the motivation to arrest him would be to extort money from him because the police
would assume he was wealthy, having lived in a foreign country.” 150 Here, the court
assessed whether Usmanov belongs in a statutorily protected group, not whether his fear is
well-founded.
141
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The court treated “objectively reasonable fear” as just another analysis of all the
components in the definition of a refugee without even identifying which components it
was analyzing. The court should have analyzed each of the elements of being a refugee
separately, not in the analysis regarding an “objectively reasonable” fear, if these elements
truly were points of contention. Instead, the court engaged in a jumbled analysis that
discussed other elements of proving one’s refugee status all under the objective component.
Regardless of whether the court reached the correct decision, the court failed to effectively
illustrate the meaning of an “objectively reasonable” fear, the very basis upon which the
court ultimately denied the petition.
In addition, the Eleventh Circuit mentioned the language of a “reasonable possibility”
but did not explain what that meant or how this was different from “more likely than
not.”151 The court stated that the evidentiary burden is having a “subjective and objective
fear,” which means that the asylum seeker has to have a “good reason to fear future
persecution.”152 Again, the court reiterated that the asylum seeker must have “specific,
detailed facts showing a good reason to fear that she will be singled out for persecution on
account of the statutorily protected factor.” 153 This is drastically different from the
language that the Seventh Circuit and Ninth Circuit employed and appears to be a stricter
standard than the ones that the other courts used. The Seventh Circuit referred to “a
reasonable possibility of actually suffering such persecution” and the Ninth Circuit pointed
to how a 10% chance of persecution is sufficient to establish a well-founded fear.154 The
Eleventh Circuit’s language of “good reason to fear that he or she will be singled out for
persecution” suggests a higher burden of proof than the Seventh and Ninth Circuit’s
interpretations since a “good reason” seems to require more justification than a “reasonable
possibility” or a 10% chance of persecution.
The court in Usmanov cited Najjar v. Ashcroft to find support for its use of “good
reason to fear” language to interpret the meaning of an objectively reasonable fear.155 In
Najjar v. Ashcroft, a Palestinian Muslim couple were denied asylum because they failed to
demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution on account of any statutory factor that was
supported by substantial evidence. 156 In Najjar, the court stated that well-founded fear
means having a “good reason to fear” persecution.157 Significantly, the Eleventh Circuit in
Najjar cited to Mgoian v. INS, a Ninth Circuit case, in order to draw authority for its “good
reason to fear” language.158 Yet, the Ninth Circuit directly stated in the Mgoian opinion
that “the question is whether Mgoian presented sufficient evidence to support a finding of
a reasonable fear of persecution in a similarly situated applicant.”159 Furthermore, as seen
in the previous cases, the Ninth Circuit has not referenced this language of “good fear”
very often in its own cases. Thus, delving into what the circuit courts cite to justify their
151
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differing standards not only shows how courts analyze objectively reasonable fear in
strikingly different ways but also how the circuit courts are prone to use the standard that
they desire depending on the case.
In the end, the Eleventh Circuit fails to mention what the BIA and other circuit courts
have stated: an applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution if a “reasonable person in
[his or] her circumstances would fear persecution if [he or] she were to be returned to [his
or] her native country.”160 The court also fails to emphasize that an objectively reasonable
fear of persecution must be “in light of the circumstances” of the asylum seeker.161 Finally,
the Eleventh Circuit declines to assert that a 10% possibility of persecution would be
sufficient to demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution.
In fact, the Eleventh Circuit's asylum cases serve as an example of how the circuit
courts are susceptible to using a standard that is higher than the standard that it should be
imposing according to Cardoza-Fonseca. 162 In Sepulveda v. U.S. Atty. General, the
petitioner argued that the IJ applied a heightened standard of “more likely than not,” thus
violating the Supreme Court's decision in INS v. Cardoza–Fonseca. 163 The Eleventh
Circuit simply stated that there was no indication in the record the IJ applied an incorrect
standard.164 The court pointed to how the IJ used the language of “reasonable possibility”
rather than the “more likely than not” standard.165 However, the court did not review what
the IJ actually considered in terms of evidence but restated the standard that the IJ
supposedly used.166
For example, the court in Sepulveda did not examine whether the IJ actually imposed
a higher burden of proof by demanding more evidence besides the asylum seeker’s own
accounts of threatening phone calls and death threats and a bomb being placed in her
mailbox.167 The court did not explain at what point the evidence that the IJ demands would
violate the Cardoza-Fonseca standard and require the asylum seeker to prove that her fear
of persecution would more likely than not occur if she returned to Colombia. Part of this
lack of specificity is due to the fact that the BIA and the various courts have not come to a
conclusion about what probability of persecution an asylum seeker has to establish. The
vagueness in the standard allows for such claims about the courts using an improper
standard to be brushed aside without much scrutiny.
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THE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF A CONVOLUTED OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE WELLFOUNDED FEAR
A. Challenges for Practitioners

First, the confusing nature of the objective analysis has led to inefficiency for
attorneys practicing asylum law.168 Because the well-founded fear analysis is now split into
the two components of a subjective and objective fear, courts have been using the objective
component to evaluate all of the asylum seeker’s evidence. Because the well-founded fear
analysis has become a separate, substantive analysis that is different from proving
persecution on account of a nexus factor, attorneys have to use the same evidence in order
to establish that asylum seekers have a reasonably objective fear for the well-founded fear
analysis and separately prove persecution, belonging in a protected class, and the nexus
between the two elements.169 The analysis becomes repetitive because the same evidence
is advanced to prove two very similar elements. Furthermore, the vagueness of the wellfounded fear standard, and therefore the objective component, has made it difficult for
practitioners to know what evidence they must present in their briefs. Practitioners face
adverse findings when courts implicitly use a standard that is different from the ones the
practitioners are applying, or the courts impermissibly use a standard that violates the more
generous standard provided in Cardoza-Fonseca.
B. Increasing the Likelihood of Bias to Affect Decisions
In addition, failing to clarify the objective fear standard can lead asylum officers and
other judges to rely more heavily upon their own biases and personal inclinations rather
than a straightforward legal analysis. Cardoza-Fonseca left behind a great amount of room
for inconsistent proceedings. At most, the more generous evidentiary standard would mean
that adjudicators should consider asylum seekers’ home country conditions and their state
of mind more in asylum cases.170 However, because of the confusion of how to properly
apply the well-founded fear standard, immigration courts, the BIA, and circuit courts are
likely to continue to defer to State Department opinions and BIA decisions that often are
adversarial towards asylum seekers.171 This is detrimental in proceedings where the denial
of an application could mean condemning a person to death.
The lack of clarity regarding the well-founded fear standard makes asylum seekers
even more vulnerable to the implicit biases of immigration judges. 172 They face more
obstacles in engaging in meticulous, thoughtful analysis due to their high caseloads, and
often are plagued with low motivation resulting from the high levels of stress and
burnout.173 Moreover, the cases they have to adjudicate are legally and factually complex
cases, and less experienced judges may unknowingly rely more on mental shortcuts and
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biases rather than proper application of the law.174 Yet, their decisions hold a lot of power
as they are the initial factfinders, and their decisions receive limited review by BIA and the
federal court of appeals.175
Research confirms that officers and judges are prone to rely on their previous
preconceptions, and the lack of clear and consistent standards in asylum proceedings does
not ameliorate this dangerous reality.176 The statistics regarding how asylum officers and
judges adjudicate their claims based on gender, previous work experience, and other factors
show that the judges are already prone to decide based on their own biases and
prejudices. 177 Clear interpretations with precise language would make judges more
accountable by forcing them to explain their justifications in a more coherent way and
encouraging them to base their decisions on legal standards rather than their own prejudices.
The authors of Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication aptly express how
“particularly discomfiting” it is to know that the outcome of a case is strongly influenced
by an identity or attitude of the officer or judge when an erroneously denied application
will almost always mean being deported back to a country where the person’s life is in
danger.178 Thus, the high stakes in asylum cases mandates a change that will allow for more
fair and consistent proceedings.
IV.

RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO THE WELL-FOUNDED FEAR OF PERSECUTION ANALYSIS

Although the Supreme Court wanted to clarify the meaning of well-founded fear in
Cardoza-Fonseca, the BIA and the circuit courts have used the Supreme Court’s
observations regarding a subjective and objective component in a well-founded fear and
transformed it into a separate convoluted analysis in future persecution claims. 179 The
unnecessarily elaborate analysis has not only led to inconsistent proceedings within the
BIA and the circuit courts but also created additional burdens for asylum seekers who have
to proffer the same kind of evidence multiple times in their asylum application. In addition,
some courts may still reject applications with any objective evidence that counters an
asylum seeker’s claim and find a lack of a well-founded fear, even though some courts
interpret a well-founded fear as a 10% chance of persecution.180
Courts should stop using the subjective language to interpret the statutory language
of a well-founded fear because an asylum seeker’s subjective fear should be presumed if
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the person submits an application. This component adds nothing substantive to the analysis;
if asylum applicants can make a showing that they fulfilled the evidentiary burden of
proving that they have a well-founded fear, then the asylum seekers should be presumed to
have a fear of returning to their country. The Ninth Circuit illustrated how the subjective
component does not hold much weight in an asylum proceeding when it concluded that
applicants could have a subjective fear of returning to their native country even if their own
testimonies were not credible. 181 The court relied on the fact that there was evidence that
other asylum seekers who evacuated from their country at the same time as the asylum
seeker did have a genuine subjective fear.182 Furthermore, the court states that “most people
are sensible enough to harbor a genuine fear of persecution if the actual likelihood of
persecution is high,” demonstrating that if there is sufficient objective evidence showing a
reasonable person would fear persecution, the subjective fear should be a given.183
Second, the Supreme Court should discard the objectively reasonable language. A
well-founded fear should simply be interpreted as “a reasonable possibility of persecution.”
The Supreme Court should clarify that a well-founded fear is not a separate element that
asylum seekers need to prove when establishing future persecution but an evidentiary
burden that refers to the likelihood of the persecution based on established facts. A
reasonable possibility should be determined to be a more generous standard of at least a
10% chance of persecution, as the Supreme Court suggested in Cardoza-Fonseca when it
stated in a hypothetical example that an adult male person who faced a 10% chance of
being put to death or sent to a remote labor camp would have a well-founded fear of
persecution upon his return.184
Moreover, the central analysis should not be about the 10% chance of persecution
but should focus on whether the asylum applicant has established each element needed to
prove refugee status. Courts should evaluate each element of refugee status separately and
see if a person fears harms that rise to the level of persecution, the person is in a protected
group, and there is a nexus between the persecution and the protected group. After
producing a structured analysis, the court can briefly determine if the asylum seeker has
met the threshold of facing at least a 10% chance of persecution based on whether the
asylum seeker has sufficiently established each element of being a refugee. Changing the
way courts interpret a well-founded fear would help eliminate the repetitive analysis that
is often caused by the objective component.
CONCLUSION
Although determining whether an asylum seeker has properly met an evidentiary
burden is a difficult process, there must still be a threshold that allows adjudicators to have
a frame of reference and to decide cases in a more consistent manner. Failing to come to a
consensus about the interpretation of well-founded fear will only lead courts to apply the
burden of proof that they want in any given case. The ambiguity regarding an objectively
reasonable well-founded fear can allow adjudicators to say they are denying an applicant
because the applicant’s claim had no objective basis. The objective component can
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sometimes mask the fact that the adjudicators did not sufficiently analyze the asylum
seeker’s claim before rejecting the application. The BIA and other judges may also be
misapplying the standard that is needed for an objective fear because there is so much
ambiguity in the well-founded fear standard. The dangers of using the ambiguous language
of an objectively reasonable well-founded fear are too striking to ignore. The disparities in
asylum adjudication due to the confusion about how to apply the various components of a
well-founded fear cannot progress any further when asylum seekers’ lives continue to be
jeopardized every day in United States courts.
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